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AbStrACt
Through the Polluter-Pays-Principle (PPP), it is generally assumed 
that the additional cost of internalization is passed on to consumers. 
However, stiff competition in the world market could make it difficult 
for exporters to pass on to international consumers, thus profit margin 
on export commodities is eroded and exports may be curtailed. This 
situation prevails in many developing countries which export a large 
proportion of their commodity production. When pollution control costs 
are substantial, voluntary implementation of environmental policy in 
the commodity export sector of a country may be problematic. Studies 
have shown mixed results that generalizations on the competitive 
effects of eco-friendly agriculture are unwise. Results of our study 
reveal that stricter environmental regulation to increase the cost of 
chemical inputs to encourage farmers to produce eco-friendly pepper 
products would enhance the export market competitiveness of both 
black pepper and white pepper production in Malaysia. On the other 
hand, to produce cocoa in a manner consistent with eco-friendly 
objectives requires huge sum of investment by the government.  
Each producer has different cost structure such that internalization of 
production externalities may result in higher cost of production for 
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author (s) of this paper.
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some countries but reduced cost for others. Cocoa growers in Brazil 
estimated an increased cost of 13.33% over variable costs at average 
productivity to compensate for adequate soil management, disease 
prevention and maintenance of production infrastructure. In Malaysia, 
one-third of the cost of production is accounted for the labour in 
combating the cocoa pod borers in estates in Sabah thus increasing 
the overall cost of production by 14%. However, evidence shows a 
reduction in the cost of production by 77% in Indonesia due to low 
wages in agriculture.
Keywords: Environment, Sustainable Agriculture, Competitiveness 
and Trade.
INtrODUCtION
Trade has served as the driving force behind much of a country’s economic success. 
With a marked increase in interest on trade and environmental matters globally, 
developed as well as developing countries are aware of the imperative need to 
restore environmentally sound and sustainable growth, but at the same time they 
are concern that trade measures could be used as new forms of non-tariff barriers 
(NTB) to undermine the competitiveness of their export-led growth.
Environmental externalities arise both in developed and developing countries. 
In developed countries, internalisation of environmental externalities is to a large 
extent a matter of “getting the prices right”, i.e. of ensuring that private and social 
relative prices are roughly equal.  This is also important in developing countries, 
but here the welfare effects of policies may be as important as the relative price 
effects.  Better integration of trade and environmental policies would provide mutual 
benefits and enable trade-offs to be made between competing objectives.
The basic relation between trade and the environment is straightforward. 
Environmental damage is associated with the production and consumption of 
goods.  International trade alters production and consumption, thus affecting 
the environment.  The use of policy instruments (both regulatory and economic 
instruments) to protect the environment can either affect international trade and act 
as non-tariff barriers to trade, or create opportunities for environmentally-sound 
products because of an increased awareness of environmental problems.  Thus, trade 
and environment issues can be divided into two broad categories.  One deals with 
the impacts of changes in trading rules and liberalisation on the environment and 
the other with the impacts of changes in environmental regulations on international 
trade prospects.
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tHE ISSUE
Measures taken to protect the environment in production involve additional costs 
to the producers.  Can these costs be passed on to the consumers? Or be borne 
by the producers? When the products are traded in international markets are the 
international consumers willing to pay for these additional costs in terms of higher 
prices? Countries which ignore measures to protect their environment are competing 
on a different level of playing field and could offer a distorted price.  Thus, 
competitiveness in pricing becomes a concern that many developing countries are 
alleged to strategically ignore environmental degradation.  This paper highlights the 
investigation on trade effects of sustainable agriculture in two different industries, 
viz. pepper and cocoa and found that the effects are industry specific and cannot 
be generalized.
MALAYSIAN CASE StUDIES
Case #1 : trade and Sustainable Pepper Production
Background
Pepper is grown predominantly in the state of Sarawak which accounts for 98% 
of the country production.  Malaysia is now the sixth largest pepper producer 
in the world after Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Brazil and China with the annual 
production of about 20,000t in 2005.  In terms of export, Malaysia ranks fifth with 
an annual export volume of 18,000t (IPC, 2006).  Sarawak pepper is well-known 
for its consistency and reliable quality in the international market.  Pepper prices 
have always been volatile.
Pepper cultivation is mainly carried out by the rural poor smallholders.  Pepper 
is in fact the most important cash crop in Sarawak, providing employment to 
some 74,710 families in the state (DOA, 2005).  Pepper farmers have involved in 
that cultivation for years, as such they were used to their traditional methods of 
cultivation which depended heavily on chemical inputs.  Thus, to promote eco-
friendly pepper production in Malaysia, a public policy to educate and change 
the mindsets of these illiterate pepper farmers is imperative.  One of the feasible 
policy options might be to enact stricter environmental regulations through raising 
the costs of chemical inputs used by pepper farmers so that these pepper farmers 
were induced to produce only eco-friendly pepper products that comply with 
international environmental standards or that meet the food safety requirements 
set in the global arena.
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Objective
The objective of this study was to evaluate the export market competitiveness of 
adopting eco-friendly pepper production in Malaysia.
Methodology
Simulation analysis was carried out using the modified version of Larson’s (2002) 
methodology to examine the impact of the proposed policies to induce a reduction 
or even total elimination of chemical inputs use on pepper export in Malaysia so 
that practical policy options for the development of a viable and competitive pepper 
industry in Malaysia can be implemented.  The sample period of 1980-2004 included 
periods of high pepper prices which prevailed between 1985 and 1989 and during 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 –2000.
Results
Results of our simulation are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 
reflect the increase of chemical input prices of 10 percent, 50 percent and 100 
percent respectively during the periods of high and low profitability.  The higher the 
increase in the chemical cost, the greater would be the reduction in the production 
and export of pepper, ceteris paribus.  The similar price increase in chemical input 
was seen to have greater impact on black pepper relative to white pepper.  When 
stricter environmental regulations were imposed by government which would 
cause the chemical input becomes more expensive, producers will normally react 
by reducing the use of the relatively more costly chemical inputs or even totally 
eliminate the use of these chemical inputs.  This is particularly true if the input 
price had increased substantially and significantly.  The increase in chemical cost 
would encourage farmers to be more judicious in utilizing their limited resources 
and also to be more efficient in their production process (Wong Swee Kiong, et 
al. (2007).
Interpretation
When pepper farmers were induced to produce cleaner- and safer-to-consume 
pepper products due to the increase in chemical cost, this would subsequently 
cause a higher price being fetched in the international market for the higher quality 
pepper produced in Malaysia.  By taking into consideration the export price 
adjustment, the simulation results suggest that a 10% increase in the chemical cost 
alone would increase black pepper production by between 0.47-0.62% and black 
pepper export by 0.50-0.65% and it would increase white pepper production by 
0.20-0.33% and white pepper export by 0.20-0.34%.  After taking into account 
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the export price adjustment, a 50% increase in the chemical cost alone, however, 
would increase the black pepper production by 2.37-3.11% and black pepper export 
by 2.48-3.25% and it would cause an increase of 0.98-1.64% and 1.01-1.68% for 
white pepper production and white pepper export respectively.  In addition, an 
increase in chemical cost by 100% would induce 4.74-6.22% more black pepper 
to be produced and 4.96-6.50% more to be exported whereas it would induce a 
1.97-3.27% additional white pepper to be produced and 2.01-3.35% additional to 
be exported.
Disparities in the impacts of stricter environmental regulations on pepper 
production and export found in white as contrasted to black pepper before the export 
price adjustment could be explained by the following reason: black pepper farmers 
are mostly very poor farmers.  Whenever there is an increase in the chemical input 
cost, they must reduce the use of chemical input drastically in their production 
process, which would subsequently cause a greater reduction in the black pepper 
production and black pepper export as compared to white pepper production and 
white pepper export.
Despite that, after taking into account the export price adjustment, the impacts 
of stricter environmental regulations were seen to give more significant positive 
effects on black pepper production and exports as compared to its white pepper 
counterparts.  This showed that a genuine improvement in black pepper quality 
would occur if government were to impose stricter environmental regulations since 
white pepper had already been considered as cleaner products relative to black 
pepper because of its further processing process.  Thus, it was clearly seen from 
the simulation analysis above that imposing stricter environmental regulations by 
increasing the cost of chemical inputs used by pepper farmers to promote eco-
friendly pepper production did not threaten the export competitiveness of our pepper 
industry.  Indeed, it will enhance the export market competitiveness of our pepper 
industry in Malaysia and the effect is particularly significant in the black pepper 
production and export than in the white pepper production and export.
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Case #2 : trade and Sustainable Cocoa Production
Background
Externalities in cocoa production are in general similar to many cocoa producers. 
Of the externalities identified, only the use of agro-chemicals such as fertilizers, 
insecticides, pesticides and fungicides could pose problems to the environment 
and are the major concern to the producers and environmentalists alike.  However, 
they are applied at minimum levels.  Farmers in Ghana, for example, do not apply 
fertilizers except for demonstration and research purposes.  Leaves litter provide 
enough nutrients to cocoa trees planted under thinned forests.  Farmers are taught 
how to control pests and diseases through biological control, minimum use of 
insecticides, shade and canopy manipulation.  The sweatings (fruit juice) and 
wastes from cocoa pod husks have already found uses and studies are undertaken 
to determine its viability as commercial products.  Each stage of cocoa production, 
from planting to primary processing involves environmental externalities.
Objective
The objective of the study is to evaluate the economic impact of sustainable cocoa 
production using the integrated pest management (IPM).
Methodology
Evaluating the economic impact of sustainable cocoa production involved two 
major steps.  In the first step, a production function was estimated and the cost of 
an IPM technology quantified.  Efforts to internalize environmental externalities 
increased the cost of production through the production function, estimated 
approximately at 15.6 percent (Khalid et al., 1995).  In the second step, a market 
model was developed and estimated.  A conservative 14 percent increase in the 
cost of production due to internalization was chosen for simulation (though the 
difference was marginal) after taking account of expert opinions that only less than 
10 percent reduction in agro-chemicals was plausible given their already low level 
of usage and the Brazilian estimate of 13.3% increase in price to compensate for 
sustainable production.
Results
The structural equations of the Malaysian model are presented in Table 3.  The 
Malaysian model was then simulated over a fifteen-year period, 1990-2005 to 
generate base solutions (Table 4).  Simulation of the model was conducted by 
increasing the cost of production by 14 percent.  As expected, the production of 
cocoa beans declined.  However, the reduction in production was only marginal, 
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i.e. 2.08 percent (Table 5).  This was due to the inelastic response of the production 
to the cost of production.  The inelastic response was quite common for perennial 
crops because investment in perennial crops like cocoa involved a long gestation 
period.  Thus, once cocoa trees were planted, they became a fixed investment and 
as long as the market price was above the average variable cost, cocoa would be 
harvested.  The effects on exports, domestic consumption and imports were also 
very marginal, at around 0.07, 0.58 and 1.14 percent, respectively (Khalid and 
Audrey, 2006).
table 3 Estimated Structural equations of Malaysian cocoa
Production
PRCBt = 36129.306 + 4.696 PCt 
(2.482)
– 6.464 PCt-1 
(-3.198)
– 0.679 PCt-2 
(-0.661)
+ 7.998 PCt-3 
(4.255)
+ 5.513 PCt-4 
(2.491)
– 196.180 RSS1t-3 
(-4.464)
– 1.774 COSPCt 
(-1.001)
– 3.247 COSPCt-1 
(-1.988)
– 2.003 COSPCt-2 
(-1.374)
+ 0.786 PRCBt-1 
(23.032)
+ 60268.738 
(9.570)
R2 = 0.996 h = – 0.014
Domestic Demand
DDCBt = – 11193.923 – 0.559 PCt 
(1.265)
– 1.578 IMPCt 
(2.323)
+ 0.729 MPIt 
(9.272)
R2 = 0.858 D.W = 1.740
Import Demand
IMCBt = 2207.72 – 0.030 IMPCt 
(-2.789)
+ 0.003 MPIt 
(2.884)
– 847.241 XCRt 
(-4.392)
+ 1239.44 DUMIt 
(12.868)
R2 = 0.936 D.W = 1.883
Domestic Price
PCt = – 959.677 + 1.126 EXPCt 
(19.164)
R2 = 0.973 D.W = 1.852
Export Demand
EXCBt = – 70005.579 – 3.792 EXPCt 
(-1.312)
+ 80.850 WGDPt 
(16.940)
+ 14501.225 XCRt 
(1.408)
R2 = 0.975 D.W  =  2.049
Export Price
EXPCt = 656.639 – 0.0014 STCB 
(-0.081)
+ 1.894 WPCt 
(11.660)
+ 0.281 EXPCt-1 
(3.367)
R2 = 0.970 h  =  0.495
where,
PRCBt = production of cocoa beans
DDCBt = domestic demand of cocoa beans
IMCBt =  import of cocoa beans
EXCBt = export of cocoa beans
PCt =  domestic price of cocoa beans
COSPCt  = cost of production
RSS1t = price of rubber
IMPCt = import price of cocoa beans
MPIt = Malaysian producer price index
XCRt = exchange rate
EXPCt = export price of cocoa beans
WGDPt = world income
WPCt = world price of cocoa beans
STCB = Malaysian stocks of cocoa beans
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
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table 4 Historical simulation results of Malaysian cocoa
PrCb EXCb DDCb IMCb EXP PC
RMSPE 0.093 0.073 0.112 0.096 0.070 0.076
U 0.050 0.052 0.066 0.052 0.030 0.031
Um 0.034 0.000 0.011 0.022 0.009 0.036
Us 0.073 0.012 0.032 0.053 0.004 0.119
Uc 0.893 0.988 0.957 0.925 0.987 0.845
Note: Um – fraction of error due to bias.
Us – fraction of error due to different variation.
Uc – fraction of error due to different covariation.
table 5 Average simulated values of endogenous variables with an increase 
in production cost
Variables baseline Values Simulated Values % Change
PRCB 154072.58 150864.58 -2.082
EXCB 112062.93 111976.79 -0.076
DCCB 39844.92 39615.22 -0.576
IMCB 496.54 490.88 -1.140
Interpretation
The reduced quantity in the Malaysian production and quantity exported was 
inserted in the world market model.  The model was then simulated without and 
with reduction in the Malaysian cocoa production.  The simulation results indicated 
that there were no changes in the world cocoa prices (Table 6).  Since Malaysian 
export price was very much dependent on the world price, there was also no 
change in the Malaysian export price.  Thus, if Malaysia alone were to implement 
the environment friendly production practices, it would incur additional cost of 
production without additional increase in output prices.
table 6 Estimated structural equations of world cocoa
Production
WPRCBt = – 324.899 + 0.017 WPCt 
(2.184)
+ 0.026 WPCt-1 
(2.261)
– 0.0167 WPCt-2 
(-1.166)
– 0.001 WPCt-3 
(-0.116)
+ 0.025 WPCt-4 
(2.377)
+ 0.028 WPCt-5 
(1.166)
+ 0.706 WPRCBt-1 
(2.113)
R2 = 0.940 D.W = 2.029
Demand
WKOCt = 1290.676 – 0.083 WPCt 
(-2.839)
+ 0.328 WYt 
(9.673)
R2 = 0.949 D.W = 1.823
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table 6 (Continued)
Price
WPCt = 988.617 0.679 WSTOKt 
(2.325)
+ 1.115 WKOCt 
(1.861)
+ 0.630 WPCt-1 
(8.443)
+ 128.121 DUM 
(4.987)
R2 = 0.869 D.W = 2.076
where,
WPRCBt = world production of cocoa beans
WKOCt = world consumption of cocoa beans
WPCt = world price of cocoa beans
WYt = world income
WSTOKt = world stock of cocoa beans
Note: Number is parentheses are t - values.
POLICY IMPLICAtION
Controversy exists on the effects of stricter environmental regulations on trade 
competitiveness.  For instance, Khalid (1989) and Panayotou (2000) have 
highlighted that developing countries could ill afford the adverse effects of tightening 
environmental regulations through increases in production cost and corresponding 
reduction in profitability and competitiveness of the export commodities.  However, 
Porter et al. (1995) had asserted that environmental regulation can induce firms 
to innovate cleaner technologies to reduce cost of production and thus increase 
competitiveness in a dynamic world.  This argument is further supported by the 
studies done in Australia which had concluded that environmental reforms do not 
affect the competitiveness of agriculture sector in Australia (Randy & Anderson, 
2000).  Nevertheless, Jaffe et al. (1995) had stated that the impact of environmental 
regulation on trade competitiveness may differ according to structural or market 
characteristics of the industries concerned.  Besides that, according to Khalid and 
Braden (1993) and Larson et al. (2002), no generalization can be made about 
the effects of environmental regulations on exports.  The effects would critically 
depend on the magnitude of the policy change, the share of the importance of the 
regulated input in production cost, supply response, and demand elasticities and 
the possibility for efficiency improvements.  Small policy changes affecting inputs 
that account for a small portion of overall costs of products that have relatively 
inelastic export demand will have minor effect on export, vice versa.
Generalizations on the competitive effects of eco-friendly or sustainable 
agriculture are unwise.  Results of our study reveal that to produce cocoa in a manner 
consistent with eco-friendly objectives requires huge sum of investment by the 
government.  Each producer has different cost structure such that internalization of 
production externalities may result in higher cost of production for some countries 
but reduced cost for others On the other hand, stricter environmental regulation to 
increase the cost of chemical inputs to encourage farmers to produce eco-friendly 
pepper products would enhance the export market competitiveness of both black 
pepper and white pepper production in Malaysia.  Trade effects of environmental 
protection are industry-specific which can vary based on the degree of competition 
for each industry.  Highly competitive industry could be more vulnerable since 
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it has no market power to impose higher product prices compared to the less 
competitive industry.
CONCLUSION
Under the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), producers have to pay for the emissions, for 
non-compliance with environmental standards and for the use of natural resources. 
The PPP assumes that:
the real additional environmental costs can be passed on to consumers (User • 
Pays Principle/Resource Pricing/Full Resource Pricing).
conformity with PPP does not matter whether the polluter passes on to his • 
prices some or all of the environmental costs, or absorbs them.
competition ensures that the consumer is not charged too much, and that • 
producers choose efficient technologies.
The basic underlying precondition is that comparable producers are confronted 
with identical policy so that in a closed economy, the PPP works nicely.  The major 
problem arises when PPP is applied to international markets, i.e. when exporters 
have to compete with companies operating under different policy regimes.  There 
is no unity of policy: some producers face stiffer environmental policies while 
others face a more lenient policy.
Generally, the capacity of a country to pass on price increase to world market 
depends on:
the country’s international market share, •	 i.e. the higher its market share, the 
higher its degree of market power, the more likely it is that a country is able 
to effectuate a higher export supply price,
the share of the product export in the country’s total exports,•	  i.e. the higher 
the export dependency rate, the riskier it is to take unilateral measures.  The 
passing on capacity is inversely related to the export dependency factor,
the overall price elasticity of demand for the export product,•	  i.e. for all highly 
inelastic demand, price increases result in higher export earnings,
the structure and intensity of competition in international market,•	  i.e. when 
some countries increase their export volumes after a price increase, their supply 
reaction could prevent other countries from taking steps to internalise their 
production externalities.
Competition in the world market could make it difficult for exporters to pass 
on the additional costs of environmental protection to international consumers, thus 
profit margin on export commodities is eroded and exports may be curtailed.  This 
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situation prevails in many developing countries which export a large proportion 
of their commodity production.  When pollution control costs are substantial, 
voluntary implementation of environmental policy in the commodity export sector 
of a country may be problematic.  Our studies have shown mixed results that 
generalizations on the competitive effects of environmental protection cannot be 
convincingly made.
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